Psykopatologia kirjoitti:Nukkuessa voi herätä jääkaapille juomaan litran maitua. Sitten kun herää,
saattaa maitopönttö olla koskematon. Herääminen olikin unennäköä!
Mutta mistä voi tietää, jatkuuko unennäkö vielä päivälläkin. Ilmeisesti
kirjoitan tätäkin nukkuen.
Psykopatologia kirjoitti:Joo, vietänkin tämän päivän vain unelmoiden. Älkää sitten ihmetelkö tekstejäni.
Psykopatologia kirjoitti:Yllättäen Laakson metsässä tuli karhu vastaan, kun olin pyörällä.
Ajattelin ensin polkea pakoon, mutta kontio vaikuti kovin leppoisalta.
Niinpä pysähdyin ja kävin karhun jopa painiksi. Mukavia otuksia!
Hermes kirjoitti:Esimerkiksi tässä ketjussa esitetyistä ajattelijoista fiksuin on kenties 1600-luvulla syntynyt yleisnero ja Newtonin kilpailija Leibniz. Moravec, Kurzweil, yms "transhumanistit" sun muut ovat yleensä aika hörhöjä, samoin on ajatus mielen lataamisesta "ohjelmana" tietokoneeseen ja kuolemattomuuden tavoittaminen sitä kautta, jne.
Chalmers is best known for his formulation of the notion of a hard problem of consciousness in both his 1996 book and in the 1995 paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". He makes a distinction between "easy" problems of consciousness, such as explaining object discrimination or verbal reports, and the single hard problem, which could be stated "why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?" The essential difference between the (cognitive) easy problems and the (phenomenal) hard problem is that the former are at least theoretically answerable via the standard strategy in philosophy of mind: functionalism. Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physical explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states are caused by physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.
Chalmers on stage for an Alan Turing Year event at De La Salle University, Manila, March 27, 2012
In support of this, Chalmers is famous for his commitment to the logical (though, importantly, not natural) possibility of philosophical zombies, although he was not the first to propose the thought experiment. These zombies, unlike the zombie of popular fiction, are complete physical duplicates of human beings, lacking only qualitative experience. Chalmers argues that since such zombies are conceivable to us, they must therefore be logically possible. Since they are logically possible, then qualia and sentience are not fully explained by physical properties alone. Instead, Chalmers argues that consciousness is a fundamental property ontologically autonomous of any known (or even possible) physical properties, and that there may be lawlike rules which he terms "psychophysical laws" that determine which physical systems are associated with which types of qualia. He further speculates that all information-bearing systems may be conscious, leading him to entertain the possibility of conscious thermostats and a qualified panpsychism he calls panprotopsychism. Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding that the viability of panpsychism places him at odds with the majority of his contemporaries.
Paluu Psykologiaa ja psykopatologiaa
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